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The  New  England  colonies  quickly 
adopted various forms of property tax-
ation  to  finance  public  services  and 
projects that were likely to increase 
property  values.    Through  participa-
tion  in  town  meetings,  town  coun-
cils,  and  “home  rule”—classic  New 
England institutions—citizens grabbed 
the local tax and spending reins.  Yet, 
ever since, Connecticut residents and 
their  representatives  have  debated 
the  merits  and  flaws  of  the  local 
property tax.  Current reformers range 
from  those  who  see  the  tax  as  the 
enemy  of  open  space  (presumably 
because it encourages towns to raise 
revenue  by  seeking  development)  to 
those who champion cuts in all taxes 
as a way to limit government’s role.  
west  Hartford’s  2005-06  revalua-
tion  highlights  the  problems  associ-
ated with the venerable property tax 
and  some  key  issues  in  the  reform 
debate.  Given the problems, includ-
ing the “sticker-shock” effect of infre-
quent revaluations, it may be time to 
employ fairer and less costly assess-
ment practices and to consider other 
sources of local funding. 
UGLY PUMPkIN OR GLISTENING 
COACH?
	 On	 the	 surface,	 property	 taxes	







shows	 the	 relatively	 strong	 negative	
relationship	between	the	EMR	and	per	
capita	 income.	 	 Residents	 of	 poorer	
towns	like	Bridgeport,	Hartford,	New	
Haven,	 and	 Waterbury	 tend	 to	 pay	
higher	effective	property	tax	rates	than	
residents	 of	 wealthier	 towns.	 	 Why?	 	
Simple:	 wealthy	 towns	 typically	 have	
more	taxable	property	per	head,	requir-
ing	 a	 lower	 rate	 to	 produce	 a	 given	





	 Because	 lower-income	 persons	
often	 face	 higher	 EMRs	 and	 spend	
larger	shares	of	their	incomes	on	prop-
erty	taxes	than	those	better	off,	some	




regressivity.	 	 Whatever	 one’s	 view	 of	
the	 matter,	 property	 tax	 rates	 are	 far	
from	uniform,	and	this	has	become	an	
argument	 for	 either	 equalizing	 com-
munities’	property	tax	rates	or	funding	
local	 services	 with	 a	 higher-level	 tax	
levied	by	counties,	regional	authorities,	
or	states.		California	(Proposition	13),	

















point.	 	 Nick’s	 $200,000	 property	 is	
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Per Capita Income (000s), 2000 Census
SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy, based on data from the 
Office of Policy and Management and U.S. Census Bureau.













It may be time to 
employ fairer and less 
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new	 and	 upon	 completion	 was	 cor-








while	 Andy	 will	 pay	 only	 $2,500	 (=	
25x100).		So	Nick’s	taxes	exceed	Andy’s	
by	40%,	even	though	both	properties	
have	 the	 same	 market	 value.	 	 Such	
discrepancies,	 arising	 from	 inaccurate	
property	 assessments,	 delayed	 revalu-
ations,	etc.,	can	be	another	source	of	
inequities	 and	 costly	 disputes	 in	 the	
administration	of	property	taxes.
MORE wARTS





and	 reviews	 of	 property	 records	 and	
comparables,	 can	 be	 costly,	 one	 of	
the	reasons	why	towns	drag	their	feet	
in	complying	with	state	mandates	to	
regularly	 revalue.	 	 Next,	 the	 possibil-
ity	that	a	property	is	currently	under-
taxed	 or	 over-taxed—and	 that,	 come	
revaluation	 time,	 the	 distortion	 may	
be	suddenly	corrected—creates	uncer-
tainties	 that	 inhibit	 property	 trades	




as	 the	 main	 revenue	 source,	 makes	














payment	 or	 to	 reduce	 its	 take.	 	The	
visibility	and	immobility	of	real	prop-




services	 funded	 by	 the	 property	 tax	
(e.g.,	 local	 education,	 police	 services,	
fire	protection,	parks	and	playgrounds)	
are	closely	tied	to	local	tax	payments.		
	 In	 fact,	 the	 tax	 encourages	 local	
responsibility	 and	 oversight,	 because	
money	 spent	 efficiently	 increases	
the	 wealth	 of	 local	 property	 owners.	 	
Efforts	 to	 supplement	 local	 revenues	
with	 state-aid	 or	 other	 transfers	 may	
redress	inequities	or	“level	the	playing	





more	 centralized	 public	 finance	 sys-
tems,	and	that	extra	control	encourages	
taxpayer	 oversight	 and	 involvement	
because	of	the	perceived	personal	stake	
in	local	taxes	and	spending.		
	 Finally,	 when	 local	 governments	
set	 their	 own	 property	 tax	 rates	 and	
spending	 levels,	 households	 locating	




Charles	 Tiebout,	 that	 also	 provides	
incentives	for	local	governments	to	be	
more	efficient.	
A wEST HARTFORD STORY
	 Like	all	Connecticut	towns,	West	
Hartford	 relies	 heavily	 on	 the	 prop-
erty	 tax	 to	 finance	 its	 local	 services.	 	
Ninety	 percent	 of	 its	 revenues	 flow	
from	the	tax,	and	the	residential	share	
of	 the	 tax	 stream	 is	 more	 than	 3/4.	 	
West	 Hartford	 revalued	 its	 property	


















	 Individual	 burdens	 are	 complex	
and	 not	 the	 focus	 here,	 but	 we	 can	
see	 how	 payments	 changed	 in	 West	









by	 each	 property	 class	 have	 changed	
simply	because	of	revaluation?	
















	 But	 as	 unpopular	 (with	 house-




SOURCE: Town of West Hartford
Taxes Based Taxes Based Percent
Property Class on 2005 Value on 2006 Value Change
Residential 116.19 127.28 9.54%
Commercial 27.67 25.12 -9.20%
Personal 6.69 4.15 -37.96%
Motor Vehicle 16.33 10.33 -36.75%
Total 166.88 166.88 0%FALL 2008  THE CONNECTICUT ECONOMY  17 
seem	to	be,	there	are	some	strong	eco-









uations	 would	 necessarily	 rely	 more	
heavily	 on	 “statistical”	 as	 opposed	 to	
“physical”	 revaluations.	 	 Economists	
and	 statisticians	 have	 developed	 and	
refined	 “hedonic”	 models	 of	 house	






characteristics,	 and	 thereby	 estimate	
its	market	value.		When	put	to	the	test	
of	the	market,	such	models	generally	
prove	 to	 be	 reasonably	 accurate	 and	
relatively	cheap	to	update	and	apply.	
A wAVE OF THE wAND?
	 It	 may	 be	 wishful	 thinking	 to	
expect	 a	 Cinderella-like	 transforma-
tion	 of	 local	 property	 taxation—one	
that	might	significantly	reduce	current	
problems.	 	 Besides,	 some	 makeovers	
just	 aren’t	 enough	 to	 fully	 solve	 the	
problems.		Given	its	troubled	history	
and	 the	 seemingly	 widespread	 dissat-
isfaction	with	the	tax,	perhaps	we	also	
should	 be	 considering	 other	 revenue	
sources	for	local	governments.
	 In	 some	 states,	 like	 New	 York,	
cities	 have	 the	 option	 to	 tax	 income	 	
as	 well	 as	 property.	 Such	 taxes	 often	
“piggy-back”	 on	 state	 income	 taxes,	
facilitating	 computation	 and	 compli-





state	 or	 federal	 tax	 liabilities	 or	 one	
that	might	vary	by	town.			It	should	
be	noted	that	a	local	income	tax	would	
likely	 shift	 the	 emphasis	 away	 from	
property	taxation,	unlike	proposals	to	




	 Arguably	 more	 progressive	 than	
property	or	sales	taxes,	a	local	income	
tax	might	address	a	perceived	weakness	













capital	 away	 from	 high-tax	 jurisdic-
tions.	 	 Also,	 many	 folks	 regard	 two	
income	 taxes—federal	 and	 state—as	
two	too	many,	so	the	challenge	of	sell-
ing	 politicians	 and	 their	 constituents	
on	a	third	one	is	formidable.	
REALISTIC GOALS
	 In	 the	 end,	 efforts	 to	 reform	 or	
reduce	our	reliance	on	local	property	




well-tested	 statistical	 methods,	 would	
do	 much	 to	 reduce	 the	 within-town	
inequities	and	the	uncertainty	created	
by	 delayed	 but	 abrupt	 revaluations.	 	
It’s	 not	 clear	 that	 effective	 property	
tax	rates	should	be	forcibly	equalized	
between	jurisdictions.		Peoples’	differ-
ent	 tastes	 for	 public	 goods	 and	 their	





property	 tax	 with	 a	 progressive	 local	
income	tax	and	some	regional	pooling	
of	 revenues	 to	 address	 problems	 that	
affect	groups	of	towns	with	common	
interests.
*John Clapp is a Professor of Finance and Real Estate 
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be considering other 
revenue sources for 
local governments.